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ABSTRACT 
  The Supreme Court’s decision striking down a Texas statute 
prohibiting homosexual conduct in Lawrence v. Texas is vague in 
many ways. The opinion failed to articulate both the contours of the 
right the Court was recognizing and the level of scrutiny courts should 
apply when enforcing the right. When a question concerning the rights 
of minors arises under Lawrence, the answer is even more obscure. 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina faced precisely this question in 
a 2007 decision, in which the court considered whether Lawrence 
prohibited the state from prosecuting a minor for engaging in 
nontraditional sexual activity when the minor legally could have 
engaged in traditional, vaginal intercourse. This Note argues for an 
extension of Lawrence’s right to sexual privacy to minors when those 
minors may otherwise lawfully consent to sexual activity. Lawrence 
held the state may only infringe an adult’s right to sexual privacy 
when the state has some interest other than moral aversion to the 
sexual act itself. The Supreme Court has also held that minors 
generally share an adult’s right to privacy unless the state has a 
significant interest unique to the context of minors to justify the 
infringement. Because the state has no interest other than moral 
aversion when regulating the form of a minor’s sexual activity, this 
Note argues Lawrence should also protect minors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
At fourteen, R.L.C. was already involved in a sexual relationship 
with his twelve-year-old girlfriend, O.P.M.1 Despite their youth, the 
adolescents had already engaged in vaginal intercourse on several 
occasions. In North Carolina, their conduct was lawful: North 
Carolina’s age-of-consent laws permit sexual acts between minors as 
long as one partner is no more than three years older than the other.2 
In addition to vaginal intercourse, however, the adolescents had also 
engaged in oral sex. Unlike vaginal intercourse, this conduct was 
problematic. North Carolina prohibits the “crime against nature,”3 
more commonly known as sodomy. Even though many think of 
sodomy as a pseudonym for homosexual activity, traditional 
prohibitions of sodomy include even heterosexual oral sex.4 Because 
he engaged in heterosexual sodomy, R.L.C. was adjudicated a felony 
delinquent, even though the vaginal intercourse was completely 
lawful.5 In In re R.L.C.,6 the Supreme Court of North Carolina upheld 
his conviction.7 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas8 perhaps appeared to prohibit R.L.C.’s prosecution when it 
struck down a Texas statute prohibiting homosexual conduct, the 
Court’s opinion did not explain how far Lawrence’s holding reaches. 
As this Note interprets Lawrence, prohibitions of sodomy between 
adults are unconstitutional violations of an individual’s due process 
right to privacy.9 But the Court did not explain whether Lawrence 
applies to minors. The Supreme Court of North Carolina 
 
 1. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920 (N.C. 2007). 
 2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.2(a) (2000) (criminalizing “indecent liberties with children” 
when the alleged perpetrator is “a person who is under the age of 16 years” only when the 
alleged victim “is at least three years younger than the defendant”); see also N.C. GEN. STAT.  
§ 14-27.2(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2007) (addressing the sexual activity of minors with persons over 
the age of sixteen); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-27.4(a)(1), 14-27.7A (2000) (same). Section 14–
202.2(a) governs the actions of R.L.C. and O.P.M., as all of the other age-of-consent statutes 
deal with sexual activity between minors and persons over the age of sixteen. 
 3. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (2000) (“If any person shall commit the crime against 
nature, with mankind or beast, he shall be punished as a Class I felon.”). 
 4. See, e.g., State v. Harward, 142 S.E.2d 691, 692 (N.C. 1965) (defining “the crime against 
nature” as sexual “acts between humans per anum and per os,” that is, acts of anal and oral sex). 
 5. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d at 924. 
 6. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920 (N.C. 2007). 
 7. Id. at 924. 
 8. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 9. See infra Part I.C. 
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distinguished Lawrence and upheld R.L.C.’s felony conviction, 
holding that minors do not share the same constitutional right to 
privacy.10 In this conclusion, North Carolina is not alone: a month 
after R.L.C., the Supreme Court of Virginia echoed this analysis in 
McDonald v. Commonwealth,11 determining that Lawrence did not 
invalidate a statute graduating an otherwise misdemeanor sexual 
offense involving vaginal intercourse with a minor to a felony when 
that same contact involved oral sex.12 
This Note argues that R.L.C. was wrongly decided. The 
constitutional right to privacy adults hold extends to minors in many 
circumstances. When the state determines that minors may lawfully 
engage in sexual activity, the right to privacy should prevent it from 
singling out nontraditional sexuality for prosecution.13 Though 
Lawrence itself left the status of minors who engage in sodomy in 
doubt, other decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have held that 
minors have the same right to privacy as adults unless the state has a 
significant interest unique to the context of minors.14 As this Note 
argues, though the state has a significant interest in protecting minors 
from the harms of premature sexual activity, after Lawrence, the state 
does not have a significant interest in singling out nontraditional 
activities that develop within a relationship the state has otherwise 
sanctioned. Laws governing the sexuality of minors must treat 
traditional and nontraditional sexuality the same. 
 
 10. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d at 925. 
 11. McDonald v. Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d 918 (Va. 2007). 
 12. Id. at 924–25. Conceptually, McDonald was very similar to In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d at 
921, as both addressed the question of sodomy involving minors. The state has an interest in 
preventing sexual contact between minors and adults, however, and the issue in McDonald was 
a question over degree of punishment rather than criminality in general. Therefore, the 
constitutional analysis of McDonald differed slightly from R.L.C. This Note concentrates solely 
on the constitutional issues criminality raises. 
 13. This Note refers to oral sex as a “nontraditional sexual activity” because state criminal 
codes have historically called it “sodomy” to discredit it. Survey data the U.S. Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention has collected, however, indicate that an overwhelming majority 
of young-to-middle-aged Americans engage in this conduct. See WILLIAM D. MOSHER, ANJANI 
CHANDRA & JO JONES, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND SELECTED HEALTH MEASURES: MEN AND 
WOMEN 15–44 YEARS OF AGE, UNITED STATES, 2002, at 25 (Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, 
Advance Data Report No. 362, 2005), available at http://cdc.gov/nchs/data/ad/ad362.pdf 
(reporting that 90.1 percent of males and 88.3 percent of females aged 25–44 have engaged in 
oral sex). 
 14. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74–75 (1976) 
(holding that minors have a right to seek abortions and states may not restrict that right by 
permitting parental vetoes). 
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Part I briefly addresses the legal background of both age-of-
consent statutes and sodomy, including the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Lawrence, its reception by commentators, and how courts have 
applied it in North Carolina and Virginia. Part II analyzes the 
competition between the state’s interest in protecting minors and 
minors’ interests in sexual privacy. It demonstrates how, when the 
state has decided to permit minors to engage in vaginal intercourse, 
minors’ liberty interests in sexual privacy prevent the state from 
regulating the form of their sexual activity. Finally, Part III discusses 
the policy implications of the decisions in R.L.C. and McDonald. It 
observes a disconnect between statutory ages of consent and statutory 
regulation of minors’ sexual activity. It calls for stronger protection 
for minors engaging in sexual activity and a heightened awareness of 
the residual animosity toward nontraditional sexuality underlying 
these decisions. 
I.  ADOLESCENCE, LAWRENCE V. TEXAS, AND THE AGE OF CONSENT 
A. Statutory Regulation of Sex and Lawrence v. Texas 
By the age of seventeen, approximately two-thirds of all 
adolescents have engaged in consensual sexual activity.15 This high 
percentage forces states to create statutory regimes to protect 
adolescents from their own lack of maturity and from potential 
exploitation by adults. Generally, states create these regimes on a 
sliding scale. The state institutes an “age of consent,”16 which 
establishes the age at which the law presumes an adolescent is 
capable of consenting to sexual activity.17 In North Carolina that age 
is sixteen years old.18 In addition, states often create a “peer 
exception” to these laws when both parties are minors of similar 
 
 15. See MOSHER ET AL., supra note 13, at 25 (reporting that 63.5 percent of seventeen-
year-old males and 64.0 percent of seventeen-year-old females have engaged in opposite-sex 
sexual contact and that 6.6 percent of seventeen-year-old males and 5.1 percent of seventeen-
year-old females have engaged in same-sex sexual contact). 
 16. The “age of consent” is the “age at which a person may engage in any sexual conduct 
permitted to adults within that state.” RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A 
GUIDE TO AMERICA’S SEX LAWS 44 (1996). 
 17. CAROLYN E. COCCA, JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE LAWS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 1 (2004) (“Those ‘under age’ are deemed incapable of giving valid consent to 
[sexual] activity.”); see also POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 16, at 44–64 (collecting a fifty-
state survey of age-of-consent laws). 
 18. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-202.1 (2000) (criminalizing sexual activity between a minor 
under the age of sixteen and an adult more than five years older than the minor). 
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ages.19 In North Carolina, for example, it is lawful for a minor under 
sixteen years old to engage in sexual contact with another minor 
when the difference of their ages is within three years.20 According to 
a state official in Kansas, one rationale for this sliding-scale exception 
is that “it is impossible to identify which child is the victim and which 
is the perpetrator.”21 
This discussion is not meant to oversimplify the law concerning 
the sexual activity of adolescents. These laws “def[y] easy 
characterization.”22 In every state, the law differs on several policy 
choices: the age of participants, the types of activities the statute 
covers, the penalties for violations, whether minor participants of the 
same age are prosecuted, and what maximum range of ages still 
satisfies the peer exception if it does exist.23 
Further complicating the law governing adolescent sexuality, 
age-of-consent statutes do not singularly protect the sexual wellbeing 
of minors. In addition to establishing complex regimes regulating 
teenage sexuality, many states have historically prohibited certain 
forms of sexual activity among adults and minors alike.24 For example, 
since the reign of Henry VIII, the law has prohibited crimes against 
nature regardless of the age of its participants.25 Many American 
states, including North Carolina, have maintained this tradition, 
interpreting this prohibition of sodomy to forbid any form of sexual 
activity other than vaginal intercourse.26 This prohibition can even 
include oral sex between heterosexual couples.27 Before Lawrence, 
 
 19. See, e.g., id. § 14.202.2 (criminalizing sexual activity between a minor under the age of 
sixteen and another minor more than three years older). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Aid for Women v. Foulston, 427 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1099 (D. Kan. 2006). Not all states 
agree with this exception. Illinois concluded that when two underage minors have sex, “each is 
the victim of the other” and can be prosecuted. In re T.W., 685 N.E.2d 631, 635 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1997) (interpreting title 720, section 5/12-15 of the Illinois Code, which contains no peer 
exception). 
 22. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW 
142 (2d ed. 2004). 
 23. COCCA, supra note 17, at 2. 
 24. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (criminalizing fornication and adultery). 
 25. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193 n.5 (1986) (tracing the origins of North 
Carolina’s sodomy statute to a statute passed under Henry VIII); see also POSNER & SILBAUGH, 
supra note 16, at 65 (tracing the source of the criminalization of sodomy to the era of Henry 
VIII and to even older church law). 
 26. See POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 16, at 65–71 (collecting a fifty-state survey of 
sodomy laws and noting the lack of a uniform definition of sodomy). 
 27. Id. at 65. 
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because sodomy was illegal for anyone in these states, courts applied 
age-of-consent laws alongside the prohibition on sodomy, which 
created a bifurcated approach to regulating the wellbeing of minors: 
an adolescent’s participation in vaginal intercourse could be lawful 
because it did not violate the age-of-consent law even though that 
same adolescent’s participation in oral sex was unlawful.28 
Until 2003, the constitutionality of this bifurcated framework 
seemed well established because the Supreme Court had upheld the 
prohibition of sodomy in its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.29 
Under Bowers, the same rule applied to adults and minors: vaginal 
intercourse was legal when oral sex was not.30 The Supreme Court 
revisited the sodomy issue in 2003, however. In Lawrence v. Texas, 
the Court considered the constitutionality of a Texas statute that only 
prohibited sexual activity between members of the same sex.31 The 
Court ruled that the petitioners were “free as adults to engage in [oral 
sex] in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.”32 Lawrence 
expressly overruled Bowers.33 It also implied that its holding went 
further than merely striking down statutes targeting homosexuality—
Lawrence appears to have invalidated sodomy statutes whether they 
regulate heterosexual or homosexual couples.34 
Unfortunately for the lower courts that must apply Lawrence, the 
U.S. Supreme Court did not clearly explain the contours of the right it 
was recognizing. At the end of the opinion, the Court issued a final, 
 
 28. See, e.g., In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920, 924 (N.C. 2007) (ruling that the state may punish 
sodomy between minors as a felony under the general crime-against-nature statute rather than 
statutes governing vaginal intercourse between minors). This Note calls this division between 
age-of-consent regulation and sodomy prohibitions the “bifurcated approach,” as it regulates 
the sexual behavior of minors under two disconnected frameworks. 
 29. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986) (ruling that general prohibitions 
of sodomy did not violate the Due Process Clause). 
 30. See id. (upholding Georgia’s general prohibition of sodomy). This discussion describes 
the system that existed in states that still had sodomy statute. For a fifty-state survey of sodomy 
laws, see POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 16, at 65–71. 
 31. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003). 
 32. Id. at 564. 
 33. Id. at 578. 
 34. The Court implicitly applied its holding to laws affecting heterosexual activity as well as 
statutes like the ones before it that prohibited only homosexual activity. See id. at 575 (“Were 
we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might question whether a 
prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-
sex and different-sex participants.”). 
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unexplained caveat: “The present case does not involve minors.”35 
This caveat leaves a curious question: because many states only have 
statutes that criminalize sodomy involving minors and adults alike, it 
is not immediately clear what effect Lawrence has in cases in which 
one or both of the participants is a minor. In other words, has the 
bifurcated approach survived Lawrence, or do minors possess some 
version of this right under the Constitution? 
B. Applying Lawrence to Age-of-Consent Laws 
Courts have not resolved how to apply Lawrence to cases 
involving minors. Most state appellate decisions on point have only 
addressed prosecutions based on statutes specifically prohibiting 
sodomy involving minors rather than the general prohibitions on 
sodomy implicitly struck down in Lawrence.36 In the summer of 2007, 
the supreme courts of North Carolina and Virginia did consider cases 
in which minors were prosecuted under general sodomy statues. But 
neither decision resolved how Lawrence affects cases involving 
minors, because both courts dismissed the constitutional challenge by 
taking the caveat regarding minors at face value, holding that because 
Lawrence did not involve minors, it did not apply to minors.37 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina was the first high court 
after Lawrence to consider the constitutionality of prohibiting minors 
from engaging in the crime against nature when traditional sexual 
activity is lawful. In R.L.C., the court determined that a minor could 
be prosecuted for having oral sex with another minor even though 
their vaginal intercourse was lawful.38 
 
 35. Id. at 578. The Court made this observation along with several others. The Court 
continued, 
It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in 
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public 
conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal 
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. 
Id. 
 36. See People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29, 32–33 (Cal. 2006) (considering a statute punishing 
oral sex with a minor more severely than a statute punishing vaginal intercourse with a minor); 
Wilson v. State, 631 S.E.2d 391, 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (considering a statute prohibiting 
sodomy specifically between minors that punished the actor more severely than a statute 
prohibiting sex between minors); State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 24 (Kan. 2005) (addressing 
statutes that punished homosexual sodomy with minors more severely than traditional sexual 
relationships). 
 37. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920, 922 (N.C. 2007); McDonald v. Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d 
918, 921 (Va. 2007). 
 38. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d at 921, 923–24. 
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When R.L.C. was fourteen years old, he engaged in sexual 
intercourse and oral sex with O.P.M., his twelve-year-old girlfriend.39 
Over a year later, while police were questioning O.P.M. about an 
unrelated incident, she informed an officer of her sexual history with 
R.L.C.40 When confronted, R.L.C. admitted he had engaged in oral 
sex with O.P.M. “two [or] three times.”41 Consequently, R.L.C. was 
adjudicated a criminal delinquent for committing “the crime against 
nature.”42 Significantly, his “crime against nature” was having oral sex 
with his girlfriend;43 under state law, his vaginal intercourse with 
O.P.M. was lawful.44 
Appealing his prosecution, R.L.C. raised three issues before the 
state supreme court: first, under principles of statutory interpretation, 
the legislature did not intend to criminalize his conduct; second, the 
statute as it was applied to him violated the Due Process Clause; and 
third, the “crime-against-nature” statute was facially unconstitutional 
under Lawrence.45 The high court affirmed his felony conviction.46 
First, the court concluded that the legislature had intended to treat 
sodomy differently than vaginal intercourse and other sexual acts 
prohibited by the state’s age-of-consent statutes.47 Second, the court 
rejected the as-applied due process challenge. Because R.L.C. did not 
claim his asserted privacy right was fundamental, the court conducted 
a rational basis review and concluded that the statute was “rationally 
related to [the] legitimate government purpose of preventing sexual 
 
 39. Id. at 921. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting R.L.C.). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See State v. Harward, 142 S.E.2d 691, 692 (N.C. 1965) (defining oral sex as a “crime 
against nature”). 
 44. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2007) (criminalizing, as first-degree 
rape, vaginal intercourse between a victim under the age of thirteen and a defendant who “is at 
least 12 years old and is at least four years older than the victim”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
27.4(a)(1) (2000) (criminalizing, as first-degree sexual offense, vaginal intercourse between a 
victim under the age of thirteen and a defendant who “is at least 12 years old and is at least four 
years older than the victim”); id. § 14-27.7A (criminalizing vaginal intercourse or a sexual act 
with a victim who is thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen years old when the defendant is at least four 
years older than the victim and not married to the victim); id. § 14-202.2(a) (criminalizing 
indecent liberties between children when the defendant is under sixteen and the victim is at 
least three years younger than the defendant). 
 45. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d at 922–24. 
 46. Id. at 922, 924–25. 
 47. See id. at 924 (holding that although age-of-consent statutes “did not constrain R.L.C.’s 
sexual activity in this instance[,] . . . . the crime against nature statute did”). 
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conduct between minors.”48 The court did not directly address the 
third issue, whether North Carolina’s statute was facially 
unconstitutional after Lawrence, because R.L.C. had not properly 
preserved the facial challenge for appeal.49 
The Supreme Court of Virginia echoed the reasoning of the 
North Carolina court a month later.50 In McDonald v. 
Commonwealth, the court determined that the state could prosecute 
an adult on felony sodomy charges for having oral sex with sixteen- 
and seventeen-year-old girls, even though vaginal intercourse with 
them was only a misdemeanor.51 William McDonald was in his 
midforties when he engaged in separate incidents of “sexual 
intercourse and oral sodomy” with two girls, ages sixteen and 
seventeen.52 McDonald was convicted of four counts of sodomy under 
a Virginia law prohibiting oral sex.53 McDonald appealed his 
conviction, ultimately reaching the Supreme Court of Virginia.54 
McDonald argued that Virginia law, properly interpreted, did 
not criminalize his conduct and that the sodomy statute was 
unconstitutional both facially and as applied.55 The Supreme Court of 
Virginia, however, rejected McDonald’s statutory construction. 
McDonald observed that one statute prohibited any sexual contact 
with minors under fifteen and another prohibited only “sexual 
intercourse” between an adult and a minor fifteen years old or older;56 
he contended that, together, these statutes set the age of consent for 
sexual activity other than vaginal intercourse at fifteen years old, 
making his conduct lawful.57 The court disagreed, determining that 
the statutes created a bifurcated approach that permitted the state to 
prosecute sodomy without regard to the age-of-consent statutes.58 
 
 48. Id. at 924–25. 
 49. Id. at 922. 
 50. McDonald v. Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d 918, 921, 923–24 (Va. 2007). 
 51. Id. at 919, 923–24. 
 52. Id. at 919. 
 53. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361(A) (2004 & Supp. 2008) (prohibiting anyone from 
“carnally know[ing] any male or female person by the anus or by or with the mouth”). 
 54. McDonald, 645 S.E.2d at 919, 921. 
 55. Id. at 921. 
 56. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371. 
 57. McDonald, 645 S.E.2d at 923. 
 58. See id. at 923–24 (holding that the sodomy statute applied to sexual conduct by minors 
irrespective of age-of-consent statutes). 
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Like North Carolina, the Virginia court did not consider the 
facial challenge to the statute’s constitutionality, finding that the 
defendant had not preserved the argument for appeal.59 Although the 
Virginia court did address the as-applied challenge, it did so in the 
same cursory fashion as its counterpart in R.L.C. According to the 
court, because Lawrence observed that “[t]he present case does not 
involve minors,”60 “[n]othing in Lawrence . . . prohibits the application 
of the sodomy statute to conduct between adults and minors.”61 Thus, 
Virginia may constitutionally punish sodomy with a minor more 
aggressively than vaginal intercourse with a minor.62 
Both North Carolina and Virginia preserved the longstanding 
bifurcated approach to regulating the sexual activity of minors, which 
treats traditional and nontraditional sexual activity differently. This 
bifurcation leads to a seemingly absurd result: in North Carolina, two 
minors may lawfully have vaginal intercourse, but they are felons if 
they have oral sex until reaching maturity—when Lawrence and the 
Due Process Clause protect their privacy.63 Likewise, gay and lesbian 
adolescents endure a more restrictive age of consent in practice 
because they may not engage in any sexual activity until they reach 
the age of majority, when North Carolina and Virginia are forced to 
recognize their rights under Lawrence. 
This result is unconstitutional, however, because Lawrence 
teaches that singling out the nontraditional sexuality of adolescents 
when they may lawfully engage in vaginal intercourse violates their 
liberty interests under the Due Process Clause. To reach this 
conclusion, one must first consider exactly what protections Lawrence 
articulated, which Section C addresses. Second, one must recognize 
the broader context of minors’ rights under the Constitution, which 
exist in tension with the state’s special powers to protect minors. Part 
II presents this analysis. 
 
 59. Id. at 921. 
 60. Id. at 924 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 923 (“[T]he sodomy statute stands alone and without age restrictions 
concerning consent.”). 
 63. See In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920, 923–25 (N.C. 2007) (enforcing the state’s sodomy 
statute against a teen for engaging in oral sex when he could have lawfully engaged in vaginal 
intercourse). 
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C. Defining the Scope of Lawrence’s Holding 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas has been 
described as “famously obtuse.”64 Lawrence held that Texas’s 
prohibition of sodomy between members of the same sex was 
unconstitutional. Beyond this decision, exactly what the Court 
concluded is less clear.65 
First, the Lawrence Court failed to explain whether its holding is 
limited to laws and conduct targeting homosexuals or whether it 
protects heterosexual conduct as well. Lawrence suggests that the 
Supreme Court intended to strike down all prohibitions of sodomy as 
a violation of the right to privacy. Had the Court not intended this 
result, Lawrence would have relied on the Equal Protection Clause 
rather than the Due Process Clause. In her concurring opinion, 
Justice O’Connor argued that the Texas statute, which prohibited 
only same-sex sodomy, violated only the Equal Protection Clause by 
targeting homosexuals.66 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy 
disagreed: “Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal 
Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition would 
be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both 
between same-sex and different-sex participants.”67 
Additionally, the majority overruled precedent upholding 
general sodomy laws. Justice O’Connor favored relying on the Equal 
Protection Clause to avoid conflicting with the Court’s prior decision 
in Bowers v. Hardwick,68 which had held that general sodomy statutes 
do not violate homosexuals’ due process privacy rights.69 The 
Lawrence majority, however, expressly overruled Bowers, holding 
 
 64. Jamal Greene, Beyond Lawrence: Metaprivacy and Punishment, 115 YALE L.J. 1862, 
1868 (2006). 
 65. See id. (“Lawrence’s incontrovertible result was that Texas’s prohibition on same-sex 
sodomy violated the Due Process Clause, and that Bowers v. Hardwick was wrong, both in 
methodology and in outcome, the day it was decided. Lawrence is otherwise famously obtuse.”). 
 66. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 67. Id. at 575 (majority opinion). 
 68. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 69. See id. at 190–91 (1986) (ruling that general prohibitions on sodomy do not violate the 
Due Process Clause). The difference in the treatment of homosexuals can be seen within the 
statutes themselves. Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a)(1) (2007) (“A person commits the 
offense of sodomy when he or she performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex 
organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another.”), with TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 
21.06(a) (Vernon 2003) (“A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual 
intercourse with another individual of the same sex.” (emphasis added)), invalidated by 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. 
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that prohibitions on sodomy—whether or not they were limited to 
homosexual conduct—violated a liberty interest protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.70 The Supreme Court 
did not need to overrule Bowers if it merely intended to grant 
Lawrence relief from the Texas statute as applied to him because it 
could have done so on equal protection grounds. Therefore, by 
relying on the Due Process Clause, the best interpretation of 
Lawrence’s majority opinion is that the Supreme Court held that the 
due process right to privacy protects all nontraditional sexuality from 
the scrutiny of the state, rather than just homosexual relationships. 
The majority opinion failed to articulate, however, whether the 
recognized right should be considered fundamental.71 Though the 
Court relied on its privacy-rights jurisprudence, and the Court 
historically has treated privacy as a fundamental right and applied 
strict scrutiny, the Lawrence Court focused its discussion on the right 
of the state to regulate morality, an interest typically subject to 
rational basis review.72 By holding that the state’s asserted interest in 
morality was insufficient, it is possible the Court applied some form of 
heightened review.73 The question remains unresolved. 
Some have read Lawrence as articulating a fundamental right. In 
his essay on Lawrence, for example, Professor Tribe claims the Court 
established a fundamental substantive due process right protecting 
gay and lesbian relationships that warrants strict scrutiny.74 Though 
the Court failed to expressly articulate the level of scrutiny, he argues, 
“[t]he practice of announcing such a standard . . . is of relatively 
recent vintage . . . and has not shown itself worthy of being enshrined 
as a permanent fixture in the armament of constitutional analysis.”75 
According to Tribe, “the strictness of the Court’s standard” is 
“obvious” because of both what the Court did and what the Court 
 
 70. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 71. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 846 (3d 
ed. 2006) (“[T]he Court in Lawrence did not articulate the level of scrutiny to be used.”). 
 72. Id. This reading of Lawrence has been adopted by the Eleventh Circuit. See Williams v. 
Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004) (applying rational basis review to Alabama’s 
ban on the sale of “sex toys” and the concomitant burden on an individual’s ability to use the 
devices). 
 73. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 846 (discussing the confusion over Lawrence’s 
standard of review and citing other scholarship discussing its meaning). 
 74. Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak 
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1916–17 (2004). 
 75. Id.  
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said.76 First, the Court relied on precedents such as Griswold v. 
Connecticut77 and Roe v. Wade,78 in which the Court explicitly applied 
strict scrutiny.79 Second, the Court “invoked the talismanic verbal 
formula of substantive due process” throughout the opinion, albeit 
with the words in a different order: for example, the Court declared 
that the case addressed the “‘protection of liberty under the Due 
Process Clause [that] has a substantive dimension of fundamental 
significance in defining the rights of the person.’”80 
If this reading by Professor Tribe and others is correct, then, and 
Lawrence does create a fundamental right, what is the nature of that 
liberty interest? For Professor Tribe, the right is one to be free from 
having the state “stigmatiz[e] . . . intimate personal relationships 
between people of the same sex.”81 According to him, the Court held 
that individuals have a liberty interest in engaging in sodomy, like 
other forms of nonprocreative sexual activity, because sexual conduct 
“can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”82 
The Court’s focus was on the relationship aspect of the constitutional 
question: “To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to 
engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put 
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it to be said 
marriage is simply about the right to have sexual intercourse.”83 Tribe 
goes on to explain why Lawrence was about more than a prohibition 
of same-sex sodomy: society has conflated sodomy with 
homosexuality, and therefore any prohibition on sodomy, even a 
prohibition on sodomy between opposite-sex couples, is an invitation 
to stigmatize and demean the relationships of homosexuals.84 
Professor Tribe does not present his views as the definitive 
interpretation of Lawrence. Many commentators have concluded that 
the Lawrence right to liberty is fundamental, though using different 
 
 76. Id. at 1917. 
 77.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 78.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 79. See id. at 155 (“Where certain fundamental rights are involved, the Court has held that 
regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a compelling state interest.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 80. See Tribe, supra note 74, at 1916–17 (alteration in original) (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 
539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003)). 
 81. Id. at 1904. 
 82. Id. at 1904–05 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567). 
 83. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
 84. Tribe, supra note 74, at 1906. 
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reasoning.85 Still others, however, disagree that Lawrence articulated 
a fundamental right in the first place. 
The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has taken this view. In Lofton 
v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services,86 the 
Eleventh Circuit considered whether to apply Lawrence to a Florida 
law prohibiting a homosexual couple from adopting children.87 The 
court concluded that Lawrence did not create a fundamental right to 
sexual privacy that would trigger strict scrutiny. Of most significance 
to the court was that Lawrence had applied only rational basis review, 
rather than strict scrutiny, which would have been required had the 
Court considered the liberty fundamental.88 In addition, the Eleventh 
Circuit held the Lawrence opinion failed to apply the “two primary 
features”89 of fundamental-rights inquiries that the Supreme Court 
established in Washington v. Glucksberg.90 In Glucksberg, the Court 
held that the test of whether an asserted right is fundamental is 
whether it is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition”91 
and “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”92 In addition, to 
recognize such a right as fundamental, the Court must provide a 
“careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest.”93 
According to the Eleventh Circuit, Lawrence did not satisfy either of 
these requirements, and therefore the asserted right was not 
fundamental.94 
Regardless of whether Lawrence articulates a fundamental right, 
however, the Court did recognize some form of right based on 
substantive due process. In addition, whatever the nature of that 
liberty, the right is one that trumps the state’s interests in promoting 
traditional notions of morality. 
 
 85. See Greene, supra note 64, at 1868–75 (discussing various scholarly interpretations of 
Lawrence and arguing the Court recognized a fundamental right to autonomy when making 
status-defining decisions). 
 86. Lofton v. Sec’y of the Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 87. Id. at 806. 
 88. Id. at 817 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
 89. Id. at 816. 
 90. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 91. Id. at 720–21 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977)).  
 92. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817. 
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This was the conclusion of the Fifth Circuit in Reliable 
Consultants, Inc. v. Earle.95 In Reliable Consultants, the court 
considered whether to apply Lawrence to a Texas statute prohibiting 
the sale of sex toys.96 Texas argued that Lawrence did not apply 
because the case was limited to statutes that target a specific class of 
people, such as homosexuals. The court disagreed with such a narrow 
reading, holding the Supreme Court’s decision to rely on due process 
rather than equal protection indicated the right was much broader.97 
According to the court, “The right [Lawrence] recognized was . . . a 
right to be free from governmental intrusion regarding ‘the most 
private human contact, sexual behavior.’”98 On that reading, 
Lawrence established a right for all people, both gay and straight, to 
engage in private intimate conduct free from government intrusion.99 
The Fifth Circuit also explained that how the Supreme Court had 
phrased the constitutional question in Lawrence reinforced its 
conclusion that the Court’s focus was on protecting privacy rather 
than conduct.100 It observed that the Lawrence Court must have found 
a right to sexual privacy because the question presented considered 
whether “convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy” violate 
due process. 
 The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the question presented in 
Lawrence makes even more sense when compared with the question 
presented in Bowers. Indeed, the main difference between Bowers 
and Lawrence is not the answer those opinions delivered but the 
questions those Courts answered.101 In Bowers, the Court somewhat 
facetiously addressed the question “whether the Federal Constitution 
confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in 
 
 95. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 745 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that in 
Lawrence “[t]he Court expressly rejected the State’s rationale by adopting Justice Stevens’ view 
in Bowers as ‘controlling’ and quoting Justice Stevens’ statement that ‘the fact that the 
governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a 
sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice’” (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 
577–78)). 
 96. Id. at 740–41. 
 97. Id. at 744. 
 98. Id. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564). 
 99. Id. Before reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit considered and disagreed with the 
Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that Lawrence did not recognize a right to sexual privacy. Id. at 
743 n.23, 745 n.33. 
 100. Id. at 744. Professor Tribe makes a similar argument. See Tribe, supra note 74, at 1900. 
 101. Tribe, supra note 74, at 1899–900. 
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sodomy.”102 The answer to that question was implied in its form—the 
Constitution does not address sexuality at all. In Lawrence, however, 
the Court framed the question differently: “Whether petitioners’ 
criminal convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home 
violate their vital interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”103 In the Lawrence 
formulation, the question focused entirely on the intimacy of the 
activity without mentioning the particular form of that intimacy. For 
the Supreme Court, it was irrelevant whether the state was attempting 
to punish oral sex or vaginal intercourse between consenting parties. 
Because the form of sexual expression was irrelevant to the Court’s 
constitutional analysis, the best interpretation of Lawrence is that it 
recognizes constitutional protection for private, intimate 
relationships.104 
Though it recognized that the Lawrence court had established a 
right to sexual privacy, the Fifth Circuit also acknowledged that the 
Supreme Court left unresolved whether that right is fundamental.105 
The Fifth Circuit held it was not necessary to resolve this question, 
however, because the Supreme Court had expressly recognized the 
right, whether it is fundamental or otherwise, and the Court had 
“carefully delineated the types of governmental interest that are 
constitutionally insufficient to sustain a law that infringes on this 
substantive due process right.”106 Principal among those insufficient 
interests was the state’s interest in promoting morality.107 
As the Fifth Circuit observed,108 by adopting Justice Stevens’s 
dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, Lawrence held that moral aversion 
toward sodomy does not justify states infringing individuals’ rights to 
sexual privacy.109 In Bowers Justice Stevens had argued that “the fact 
that the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a 
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding 
a law prohibiting the practice.”110 Revisiting the issue in Lawrence, the 
Court quoted Justice Stevens and then held that “Justice Stevens’ 
 
 102. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986). 
 103. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564. 
 104. Tribe, supra note 74, at 1899–900. 
 105. Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 106. Id. at 745. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 110. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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analysis, in our view, should have been controlling in Bowers and 
should control here.”111 In the next sentence, the Court expressly 
overruled Bowers.112 Thus, the Court reversed itself and endorsed 
Justice Stevens’s view that morality is not a sufficient governmental 
interest to justify prohibiting sodomy. 
Without reaching the fundamental rights question, the Fifth 
Circuit’s view of Lawrence supports the conclusion that Lawrence 
created at least some right to sexual privacy, and the state may not 
infringe this right unless it has some reason other than moral 
aversion. This view also supports the conclusion that R.L.C. and 
McDonald were wrongly decided: singling out the nontraditional 
sexuality of adolescents when they may lawfully engage in vaginal 
intercourse violates their liberty interest just as much as it violates the 
interests of adults. To reach this conclusion, one must consider 
Lawrence in the broader context of the tension that exists between 
the special powers of the state to protect minors on the one hand and 
minors’ substantive due process rights on the other. 
II.  MINORS, THE STATE, AND SODOMY 
Minors’ constitutional rights exist in tension with the state’s 
special powers to regulate minors’ affairs. On one hand, in In re 
Gault113 the Supreme Court famously announced that “neither the 
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”114 
In a case that served as the foundation of much of the jurisprudence 
concerning the nature of minors’ rights in comparison to the rights of 
adults, the Court held that adolescent defendants have the same basic 
constitutional protections as adult defendants during criminal trials.115 
This fundamental premise that minors have constitutional rights has 
led the Court to assert other rights of minors, including certain rights 
to freedom of speech,116 freedom from unreasonable searches and 
 
 111. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 112. Id. 
 113. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 114. Id. at 13. 
 115. Id. at 33–34, 41, 55, 57. For a discussion of how In re Gault has served as a foundation 
of the jurisprudence of the rights of minors and the history of minors’ rights overall, see Chad 
M. Gerson, The Abortion Rights of Adolescents Should Be Coextensive with Those of Adults: A 
Theoretical Framework, 23 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 443, 454–58 (2006). 
 116. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969). 
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seizures,117 and the right to due process when facing suspension from 
school.118 
On the other hand, under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state 
can protect minors even when doing so would violate the rights of 
adults.119 Ordinarily, the state regulates the activities of adults under 
its police power. The doctrine of parens patriae, however, gives the 
state additional authority to regulate minors. The Supreme Court has 
justified this enhanced power of the state on three grounds: (1) the 
peculiar vulnerability of children; (2) minors’ inability to make critical 
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and (3) the importance of 
parents in child rearing.120 Thus, minors share the constitutional rights 
adults enjoy, but the state can infringe those rights for reasons not 
sufficient for adults. For example, the state can constitutionally 
establish the age at which minors may lawfully engage in sexual 
activity.121 
This Note argues, however, that when it comes to prohibiting 
nontraditional sexual activity in a context in which traditional sexual 
activity is legal, the state does not have any interest under either 
parens patriae or its inherent police power to forbid nontraditional 
sexual activity. Once the state determines that minors are capable of 
giving their consent to engage in traditional forms of sexual contact, 
prohibiting oral sex between the minors violates their liberty rights 
under the Due Process Clause. 
This Part explains why the privacy rights of minors protect them 
from prosecution for sodomy when traditional sexuality is legal. 
Section A demonstrates that the Supreme Court has held that minors 
enjoy the same privacy rights as adults unless the government has a 
significant interest in protecting minors that does not exist for adults. 
Because the state does not have an interest in prohibiting minors 
from engaging in some kinds of sexual contact but not others, Section 
A argues that courts should extend Lawrence to protect the rights of 
 
 117. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337–38 (1985). 
 118. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975). 
 119. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS & SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, 
POLICY AND PRACTICE 14–16 (3d ed. 2007). 
 120. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). 
 121. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 1994) (“[S]exual exploitation of 
children is a particularly pernicious evil that sometimes may be concealed behind the zone of 
privacy that normally shields the home . . . . The state unquestionably has a very compelling 
interest in preventing such conduct.” (alteration in original) (quoting Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 
2d 404, 410 (Fla. 1991))). 
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minors. Section B analyzes the state’s interest in regulating the sexual 
activity of minors. It concludes that, after Lawrence, a state’s interest 
in prohibiting minors from engaging in oral sex is no greater than its 
interest in prohibiting minors from engaging in vaginal intercourse, 
requiring the state to regulate the two activities equally. Section C 
bolsters this conclusion, arguing that other courts have rejected the 
state’s interest in preserving morality when deciding minors’ rights 
under equal protection claims rather than due process challenges. 
Finally, Section D contends that the North Carolina and Virginia high 
courts improperly interpreted how the Due Process Clause applies to 
the rights of minors who engage in nontraditional sexual activities. 
A. The Liberty Interests of Minors Engaging in Sexual Activity 
Lawrence v. Texas held that adults enjoy a liberty interest in 
choosing the form of their sexual expression.122 Although the Court 
also stated that the case “d[id] not involve minors,”123 Lawrence does 
not rule out extending this right to minors. In cases addressing the 
rights of minors, the Supreme Court has consistently held that minors 
enjoy rights similar to those of adults absent a unique state interest. 
Examining the Lawrence Court’s caveat in context shows that 
Lawrence did not necessarily depart from this basic principle. 
1. The Other Caveats.  The R.L.C. and McDonald courts 
contended that the Court’s caveat about minors preserves the 
prohibition of sodomy between minors,124 but that interpretation is 
not the only plausible one. The caveat may have only meant that the 
general right to sexual privacy—which Lawrence found the Due 
Process Clause confers—did not affect other statutes regulating the 
age at which minors can lawfully engage in sexual activity. In other 
words, Justice Kennedy perhaps was explaining that the general right 
to sexual privacy did not prohibit a state from enacting age-of-consent 
 
 122. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“The State cannot demean [gay 
people’s] existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. 
Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their 
conduct without intervention of the government.”); see also supra Part I.C. 
 123. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 124. See In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920, 925 (N.C. 2007) (“Lawrence is distinguishable from 
the instant case by the very language of Lawrence. . . . This juvenile case does involve minors.”); 
McDonald v. Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d 918, 924 (Va. 2007) (emphasizing the Lawrence 
opinion’s caveat that its holding did not apply to minors in the Virginia Supreme Court’s 
decision to uphold applying the state’s sodomy law to the defendant). 
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statutes generally, rather than saying that a state may forbid sodomy 
between minors. 
Comparing the caveat concerning minors with other caveats in 
the Lawrence opinion strengthens this interpretation, as Justice 
Kennedy included these other caveats in the same paragraph and 
used parallel sentence construction.125 In addition to minors, the Court 
noted that the case in Lawrence did not involve rape, prostitution, or 
same-sex marriage.126 But these legal concerns are unrelated to 
sodomy laws. Rape and prostitution were not prosecuted as sodomy, 
either at common law or under modern penal codes.127 Same-sex 
marriage is an entirely separate constitutional question, not a criminal 
offense. Thus, Justice Kennedy may have intended the caveat 
paragraph to guide the right of sexual privacy in the context of other 
laws rather than preserve the Texas statute, and general sodomy laws 
for application to factually different situations. Regardless of how this 
caveat is to be interpreted, however, the Court itself acknowledged it 
is only a statement of dicta, because the case did not involve minors.128 
Therefore, the caveat should not be interpreted to single-handedly 
deny minors any liberty interest in sexual privacy, which would depart 
from other Supreme Court precedent.129 
2. The Privacy Rights of Minors in Other Contexts.  Supreme 
Court precedent existing before Lawrence indicates that minors enjoy 
a right to privacy similar to, though not as extensive as, the right to 
privacy adults hold. The Court asserted as much in both Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth130 and Carey v. Population 
 
 125. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not involve minors. It does not 
involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where 
consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does 
not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
homosexual persons seek to enter.”). 
 126. Id. 
 127. See POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 16, at 5–34, 155–87 (describing the regulatory 
approach of all fifty states to issues of rape, sexual assault, and prostitution). Prosecutors 
occasionally bring sodomy charges instead of traditional rape and prostitution charges to 
increase potential penalties, but these cases are really prosecuting the underlying conduct—rape 
or prostitution—not the crime against nature itself. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 891 So. 2d 1233, 
1237–38 (La. 2005) (upholding a felony conviction for committing the crime against nature when 
the state could have charged the defendant with prostitution, a misdemeanor). 
 128. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 129. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (establishing a three-part test to 
determine when minors’ rights are less than those adults enjoy). 
 130. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 
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Services International,131 which addressed minors’ rights to obtain 
abortions and contraception. In Danforth, the Supreme Court held 
that a state may not create a parental veto over a minor child’s 
decision to have an abortion.132 According to the Court, 
“[c]onstitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically 
only when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as 
well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess 
constitutional rights.”133 Although the Court noted that “the State has 
somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than 
of adults,” the law would only be constitutional if “there is any 
significant state interest in conditioning an abortion on the consent of 
a parent or person in loco parentis that is not present in the case of an 
adult.”134 Concluding the state lacked such an interest, the Court held 
the requirement of parental consent was unconstitutional.135 
The Supreme Court applied this “unique significant interest” 
standard to a minor’s right to privacy again in Carey v. Population 
Services International, in which the Court considered a statute that 
prohibited distributing contraceptives to minors under the age of 
sixteen.136 In a series of fractured opinions, the Court concluded that 
completely denying minors access to contraception was 
unconstitutional.137 Six Justices reached this conclusion by applying a 
test similar to the “unique significant interest” test articulated in 
Danforth.138 According to the plurality, “the right to privacy in 
 
 131. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (plurality opinion). For a 
summary of the Justices’ positions in Carey,  see infra note 137. 
 132. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 74–75. 
 135. Id. at 75. 
 136. Carey, 431 U.S. at 681. The statute provided that only pharmacists could distribute 
contraceptives and could not distribute them to minors. Id. 
 137. See id. at 694–95 (expressing the view of four Justices that the state lacked a significant 
interest in burdening minors’ rights to privacy by preventing minors from obtaining 
contraceptives); id. at 702 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result) (expressing 
the view that the statute did not “measurably contribute[]” to the state’s offered justification of 
deterring minors’ sexual activity); id. at 707–08 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (expressing the view that the statute was unconstitutional as applied to minors 
between the ages of fourteen and sixteen who were lawfully married but could not exercise their 
right to privacy within that marital relationship); id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment) (expressing the view that the statute did not contribute to the 
state’s asserted interest of deterring minors’ sexual activity). 
 138. For a description of the opinions of the four-Justice plurality, the opinion of Justice 
White, and the opinion of Justice Stevens, as well as a summary of their views, see supra note 
137. 
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connection with decisions affecting procreation extends to minors as 
well as to adults.”139 These four Justices concluded that minors’ rights 
to privacy include a right to access contraception because adults have 
that privacy right and the state had failed to identify a significant state 
interest that justified infringing a fundamental right to protect 
minors.140 Though the remaining two Justices did not agree minors 
have a fundamental right to access contraceptives, they did apply the 
same Danforth “significant interest” test the plurality used when 
concluding the statute was unconstitutional under rational basis 
review.141 
Thus, under these two Supreme Court cases, minors enjoy the 
same rights to privacy as adults when making procreation decisions. 
Minors share this privacy right with adults because the government 
lacks a “significant state interest . . . that is not present in the case of 
an adult.”142 It should be noted, however, that this standard is less 
stringent than the one applied to burdens on adults’ fundamental 
rights. Based on the state’s power under parens patriae, state action 
only needs to survive the “significant state interest” test rather than 
the “compelling state interest test” courts usually apply to adults’ 
privacy rights.143 This less stringent standard is in deference to the 
state’s role as protector and in light of the particular vulnerability of 
children. After Lawrence, however, the state does not have an 
interest in singling out nontraditional sexual activity, even under the 
doctrine of parens patriae. Therefore, based on the theory of 
modeling minors’ rights to privacy on the rights of adults Danforth 
and Carey articulate, the protections of Lawrence should be extended 
to minors. 
 
 139. Carey, 431 U.S. at 693. 
 140. Id. at 693–96. Though the plurality concluded minors have a right to contraceptives, the 
plurality declined to rule on the larger question of whether minors have a right “to engage in 
private consensual sexual behavior.” Id. at 694 n.17. 
 141. Justices White and Stevens appear to have applied rational basis review to the statute 
because they concluded the state lacked any interest to support the statute while simultaneously 
concluding the statute did not infringe a fundamental right of minors. Id. at 702 (White, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the result); id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment); see also supra note 137. 
 142. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). 
 143. Carey, 431 U.S. at 693. 
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B. The State’s Interest in Singling out Nontraditional Sexuality 
In the case of a right to sexual privacy, the state’s interest in 
prohibiting sodomy is no greater than its interest in prohibiting 
minors from engaging in traditional sexual activity. As Part I.C 
discussed, Lawrence held that the government’s interest in promoting 
morality by itself does not justify infringing the due process liberty 
interest in sexual privacy.144 Although the state has an important 
interest in regulating the sexual activity of minor children, the state 
has no interest in singling out nontraditional sexual activity. 
Therefore, the age of consent should be the same for both. 
The state does have an interest in regulating the sexual behaviors 
of adolescents.145 A state may constitutionally regulate the age of 
consent of its minor children by criminalizing their sexual activity to 
protect them from injury.146 Age-of-consent laws are constitutional 
because they meet the “unique significant interest” standard—the 
state can decide that minors lack the maturity to give adequate 
consent, and so the state has a significant interest in protecting minors 
from harm.147 
This extremely significant state interest does not transfer, 
however, to regulating the form of sexual expression that takes place 
in a setting that the state has deemed otherwise safe for the minor. By 
allowing the minor to engage in vaginal intercourse, North Carolina 
effectively concedes that those minors are capable of giving their 
consent. Unlike age-of-consent laws, sodomy laws are justified solely 
on the basis of morality, which Lawrence deemed an insufficient state 
interest.148 Because morality is an interest “present in the case of an 
 
 144. See supra notes 106–12 and accompanying text. 
 145. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 695 n.17 (declining to decide whether minors have an 
independent right to sexual privacy that would prohibit all government regulation). 
 146. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (counseling “against attempts by the 
State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury 
to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects” (emphasis added)). 
 147. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74–75 (defining the test as whether “there is any significant 
state interest in conditioning an abortion on the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis 
that is not present in the case of an adult”); see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN 
TRAVESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES TO ADOLESCENT SEXUAL OFFENDING 125–26 (2004) (“The 
justification for adult punishment—the exploitation of the young—is missing from settings in 
which both participants are young.”); Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait: Age of Consent 
Laws and the Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 313, 315 
(2003) (“The justification usually put forward for age of consent laws is the protection of young 
persons from sexual exploitation by adults.”). 
 148. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
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adult,” unless the state can identify some other reason, such as 
evidence that prohibiting sodomy protects minors from injury, then 
Danforth and Carey suggest minors should possess a right to sexual 
privacy coextensive with adults. 
The Supreme Court of Florida has recognized these dual 
interests of the state—protecting minors from injury and safeguarding 
their morality. In B.B. v. State,149 the court determined that the state’s 
interest in preventing adult sexual exploitation trumps the minor’s 
right to privacy under the state constitution but the state’s interest in 
safeguarding morality does not.150 In B.B., a sixteen-year-old was 
charged with a felony for having vaginal intercourse with another 
sixteen-year-old under a statute punishing intercourse with a person 
less than eighteen years old who was of “previous chaste character.”151 
According to the court, the Florida state constitution confers privacy 
rights on both adults and minors, which include a right to sexual 
privacy.152 Therefore, the court considered whether “the statute 
furthers a compelling state interest through the least intrusive 
means.”153 Searching for a state interest in the minor-minor context, 
the court said the statute was “designed to protect the youth of 
[Florida] . . . from the initial violation of their actual condition of 
sexual chastity.”154 In other words, the state’s interest was 
safeguarding the morality of minors. The court determined, however, 
that adjudicating minors as delinquents was not “the least intrusive 
means of furthering . . . the State’s compelling interest.”155 Thus, the 
statute violated B.B.’s constitutional right to sexual privacy.156 
Concededly, the court did not conclude morality could never justify 
state action, even in the context of privacy rights; it only determined 
that morality was not a sufficient interest to justify criminalizing an 
activity in which the minor has a privacy interest.157 This conclusion is 
 
 149. B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995). 
 150. Id. at 259–60. 
 151. Id. at 257–58. 
 152. Id. at 259. 
 153. Id. (quoting In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989)). 
 154. Id. (quoting Deas v. State, 161 So. 729, 730 (Fla. 1935) (per curiam)). 
 155. Id. 
 156. The Florida Supreme Court was analyzing B.B.’s right to privacy under the Florida 
Constitution rather than the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 257. The Florida court’s analysis 
nevertheless assists this Note’s argument because the court addressed the state’s interests in 
regulating the sexual behavior of minors. 
 157. See id. at 260 (“At present, we will not debate morality in respect to the statute or 
debate whether this century-old statute fits within the contemporary ‘facts of life.’”). 
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not that far from the conclusion in Lawrence, which did not 
completely deny the existence of a state interest in morality either;158 
rather, Lawrence held it was not a sufficient interest to justify 
burdening the right to sexual privacy.159 
The Florida court’s analysis distinguishing regulation based on 
morality from regulation based on potential injury is instructive. The 
B.B. court emphasized this difference by explaining its earlier 
decision in Jones v. State,160 which considered a statute that 
criminalized sexual activity between an adult and a minor.161 As the 
B.B. court explained, in Jones, the court had held that the privacy 
rights of minors “do not vitiate the legislature’s efforts to protect 
minors from the conduct of others. ‘Sexual exploitation of children is 
a particularly pernicious evil that sometimes may be concealed 
behind the zone of privacy . . . . The state unquestionably has a very 
compelling interest in preventing such conduct.’”162 
In B.B. and Jones, therefore, the Supreme Court of Florida 
recognized two possible state interests in regulating the sexuality of 
minors. First, the state could have an interest in protecting children 
from harm or injury from the sexual exploitation of adults. The 
Florida court held that this interest is sufficient to overcome minors’ 
rights to sexual privacy.163 Second, the state could have an interest in 
safeguarding the morality of minors. The Supreme Court of Florida 
determined, however, that preserving morality is not a sufficient 
reason to criminalize sexual activity between minors.164 
These two interests are also applicable to the privacy interests of 
minors engaging in nontraditional sexual activity. Age-of-consent 
laws serve states’ legitimate interests in protecting minors from 
exploitation. Once the state has determined that the minors are not in 
danger and may engage in vaginal intercourse, however, the state can 
no longer assert its interest to prevent the minor from choosing 
nontraditional forms of sexual activity such as oral sex. To do so 
 
 158. See Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 745 n.36 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Our 
holding in no way overtly expresses or implies that public morality can never be a constitutional 
justification for a law. We merely hold that after Lawrence it is not a constitutional justification 
for [the statute outlawing selling sex toys].”). 
 159. See supra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 160. Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994). 
 161. Id. at 1086. 
 162. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 259 (quoting Jones, 640 So. 2d at 1086). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
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would allow the state to assert its interest in promoting morality over 
minors’ interests in privacy by criminalizing their conduct. Both the 
Lawrence and B.B. decisions counsel against this result. 
In sum, the Due Process Clause permits the state to regulate 
minors’ nontraditional sexual activity only to the degree it regulates 
traditional forms of sexual expression. Although the state has an 
interest in protecting minors from harms premature sexual activity 
causes generally, it has no additional interests in the context of oral 
sex. Courts should interpret the Constitution to require the law to 
treat both traditional and nontraditional forms equally, moral 
aversion notwithstanding. 
C. The State’s Interest and Equal Protection 
The equal protection jurisprudence that has emerged based on 
Lawrence bolsters the conclusion that the state lacks a significant 
enough interest to justify singling out nontraditional sexual activity 
among minors. Though Lawrence was decided under the Due Process 
Clause, several state high courts have extended its analysis to 
conclude that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits states from 
punishing different types of sexual contact differently.165 These cases 
support the view that minors have a due process right to engage in 
nontraditional sexual activity when the state approves of their 
participation in traditional forms of sexual behavior. 
In State v. Limon,166 the Supreme Court of Kansas concluded that 
the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from punishing acts of 
sodomy with minors more severely than acts of traditional sexual 
activity.167 In Limon, a male, one week past his eighteenth birthday, 
was convicted of engaging in oral sex with another male who was only 
fifteen.168 Under Kansas law, a sentence for sexual activity with a 
minor was fifteen times longer when the minor was of the same sex 
than with a minor of the opposite sex.169 The court applied rational 
 
 165. See, e.g., People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29, 41–42 (Cal. 2006) (concluding that requiring 
a defendant convicted of oral sex with a minor to register as a sex offender when he would not 
have had to do so if convicted of vaginal intercourse with a minor violated equal protection 
under the U.S. Constitution). But see State v. Thomas, 891 So. 2d 1233, 1237–38 (La. 2005) 
(holding solicitation for sodomy could be constitutionally punished more severely than 
solicitation for vaginal intercourse). 
 166. State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22 (Kan. 2005). 
 167. Id. at 38. 
 168. Id. at 24. 
 169. Id. at 29. 
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basis review to this grossly differential treatment, calling on the state 
to demonstrate a legitimate governmental interest rationally related 
to imposing a longer sentence on Limon’s conduct.170 The state 
maintained it had multiple legitimate state interests that would 
withstand rational basis review: specifically, preserving traditional 
sexual mores, preserving historical notions of appropriate adolescent 
sexual development, protecting adolescents from coercive 
relationships, and protecting adolescents from the health risks of 
sexual activity.171 The court rejected each of these arguments.  
The Limon court quoted Lawrence, holding that “[t]he fact that 
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular 
practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice.”172 The court said both preserving sexual 
mores and preserving historical notions of appropriate adolescent 
sexual development were justifications expressing mere “moral 
disapproval,” which could not justify punishing this conduct 
criminally.173 In addition, the court could find no evidence or 
legislative findings that sexual activity with a minor of the same sex 
was any more coercive or carried any greater risks to a minor’s health 
than did the same conduct with a minor of the opposite sex.174 Finding 
no rational basis to support the disproportionate sentence for the 
same conduct, the court held that the Kansas law violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.175 Thus, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that 
the state lacks a sufficient interest to justify treating traditional and 
nontraditional sexual activity differently. 
Kansas is not the only state high court to conclude that punishing 
nontraditional sexual activity more harshly than traditional activity 
violates equal protection principles. In People v. Hofsheier,176 the 
Supreme Court of California also addressed this question. In that 
case, a twenty-two-year-old male was convicted of engaging in oral 
sex with a sixteen-year-old.177 Though California law at the time 
required anyone convicted of such an offense to register for life as a 
sex offender, California curiously did not require lifetime registration 
 
 170. Id. at 30. 
 171. Id. at 34. 
 172. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003)). 
 173. Id. at 35. 
 174. Id. at 35–36. 
 175. Id. at 38. 
 176. People v. Hofsheier, 129 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2006). 
 177. Id. at 32. 
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for persons convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor.178 
The defendant appealed, arguing that the disproportionate 
punishment for oral sex denied him equal protection of the law.179 
The Hofsheier court first considered whether two or more groups 
of similarly situated persons existed.180 Rejecting the state’s 
contention that people convicted of different crimes were not similar, 
the court concluded that “[t]he only difference between the two 
offenses is the nature of the sexual act.”181 The court applied rational 
basis review to the equal protection claim because it did not implicate 
a suspect class or fundamental right, considering whether the 
government had any legitimate interest in preserving this disparate 
treatment.182 The Supreme Court of California concluded that the 
state has no interest to support disparate punishments for oral sex 
with a minor versus sexual intercourse with a minor.183 In other words, 
California reached the same conclusion as Kansas: the state lacks an 
interest in treating nontraditional sexual activity differently than 
traditional sexual activity. 
D. Seeking the State’s Interest in R.L.C. 
The situations in R.L.C. and McDonald are comparable to those 
the supreme courts of Kansas and California considered. Though the 
California and Kansas cases relied on equal protection rather than the 
due process issue raised in R.L.C. and McDonald, all four cases 
sought to identify a state interest to weigh against the right being 
infringed. The underlying rationale of Lawrence shows that under 
either due process or equal protection review, the state lacks a 
significant enough interest to justify singling out nontraditional sexual 
activity. 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina attempted to discern the 
government’s interests in prohibiting sodomy between minors when 
vaginal intercourse is lawful. According to the court, the government 
had an “interest in preventing sexual conduct between minors,” and 
sodomy, “[l]ike vaginal intercourse, . . . carries with it a risk of 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 36. 
 181. Id. at 37. 
 182. Id. at 38–42. 
 183. Id. at 41. 
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sexually transmitted diseases.”184 Neither of these interests is sufficient 
to justify infringing the right to privacy, however. First, if the state 
intended to prevent minors from engaging in sexual conduct in 
R.L.C.–like situations, then it would also have made vaginal 
intercourse between minors unlawful in the same circumstances.185 
The state’s contention is similar to the one Justice Powell dismissed in 
his Carey opinion, in which he argued that the state’s decision to 
allow the same minors to marry, which “sanctions sexual intercourse 
between the partners,” contradicted the state’s interest in deterring 
minors from engaging in sexual intercourse.186 Prohibiting oral sex but 
not vaginal intercourse does not deter minors from engaging in sexual 
conduct: if anything, it may encourage them to escalate their sexual 
interactions to avoid criminal activity. 
Second, the North Carolina court itself acknowledged that both 
vaginal intercourse and oral sex carry the risk of sexually transmitted 
disease.187 Adolescents are significantly less likely to contract sexually 
transmitted diseases when engaging in oral sex versus vaginal sex.188 In 
addition, vaginal intercourse involves an additional risk: teenage 
pregnancy. Because oral sex raises a much lower risk of diseases and 
other complications and the state has no other interest in uniquely 
prohibiting it, North Carolina is most likely attempting to maintain 
animosity toward a nontraditional sexual practice the Supreme Court 
has held the Constitution protects. Though even an incorrect fear of 
disease arguably could survive rational basis review, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Lawrence did not explicitly apply rational basis 
review to the question of sexual privacy. Lawrence left unclear 
precisely what level of scrutiny it was applying.189 Lawrence was 
explicit, however, in stating that a state’s animosity toward 
nontraditional sexual relationships was not a permissible state interest 
 
 184. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920, 925 (N.C. 2007). 
 185. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. 2007) (criminalizing only sexual 
activity between a minor under the age of thirteen and anyone more than three years older). 
R.L.C. was only two years older than his twelve-year-old girlfriend. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d at 
922. 
 186. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 707 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the result). 
 187. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d at 925. 
 188. Bonnie L. Halpern-Felsher et al., Oral Versus Vaginal Sex Among Adolescents: 
Perceptions, Attitudes, and Behavior, 115 PEDIATRICS 845, 848 (2005). 
 189. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 71, at 846 (discussing various interpretations of the 
standard applied in Lawrence). 
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in the due process context when considering a right to sexual 
privacy.190 
In North Carolina and Virginia, the high courts ruled that their 
states may punish sodomy between minors more severely than 
vaginal intercourse, even when sexual intercourse is not a criminal 
offense. Lawrence held that prohibitions on sodomy between adults, 
however, cannot be justified on the basis of moral aversion, and 
because states lack any other compelling state interest, prohibitions 
on sodomy are unconstitutional violations of the right to privacy. 
Danforth and Carey held that minors may possess the same rights to 
privacy as adults unless the state has a significant state interest unique 
to the context of minors. But as the high courts of Florida, Kansas, 
and California have concluded, states lack a significant interest to 
justify burdening a minor’s right to sexual privacy once that state has 
concluded minors may lawfully consent to sexual activity in general. 
Therefore, even though North Carolina and Virginia have enhanced 
powers to regulate the activities of minors under the doctrine of 
parens patriae, they do not have the power to regulate the form of 
sexuality expressed within the relationships they sanction. The 
protections of Lawrence v. Texas should be extended to minors. 
III.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF R.L.C. AND MCDONALD 
Much more than the defendants’ liberty was at stake in R.L.C. 
and McDonald. Not at issue was whether the state could regulate 
minors’ sexual activity: if the legislatures of North Carolina and 
Virginia wanted to prohibit minors from engaging in any sexual 
activity, they likely could constitutionally do so.191 Rather, these cases 
raised two overarching issues. First and most importantly, how can 
states best protect minors from harm? Second, what, if anything, 
remains of the longstanding animosity toward nontraditional sexual 
activity? These questions are interrelated. 
Lawrence created a problem beyond mere confusion over 
minors’ rights to privacy: it cast doubt on the sufficiency of pre-
Lawrence penal codes that purportedly protect minors from sex-
based harms. As Virginia’s statutory system indicates, states have 
relied on general prohibitions of sodomy when determining how to 
 
 190. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003). 
 191. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 695 n.17 (declining to decide whether minors have an 
independent right to sexual privacy that would prohibit all governmental regulation). 
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criminalize teenage sexual activity.192 Virginia’s age-of-consent laws 
only address vaginal intercourse with a minor,193 creating a loophole in 
the scheme if other sodomy laws are invalid. McDonald sought to 
take advantage of this loophole, arguing that, because the literal 
language of the statute only criminalized vaginal intercourse and not 
oral sex, he was innocent of any criminal offense.194 Although 
McDonald’s argument was technically correct, the legislature’s 
omission likely resulted from its reliance on the general prohibition 
against sodomy to do the rest of the work to protect minors from 
sexual predators. It is entirely possible, however, that the Virginia 
legislature would have intended to punish oral sex between them at 
least to the same extent it punishes vaginal intercourse. Yet if 
Lawrence took the sodomy statute out of the picture by invalidating 
it, the remaining code does not punish oral sex with a minor. Thus, 
following Lawrence, legislatures should revisit their penal codes to 
ensure both that they are adequately protecting children and that 
their laws do not violate minors’ rights to privacy. 
In addition to exposing the inadequacy of existing law to 
constitutionally protect minors, R.L.C. and McDonald suggest that 
animosity toward nontraditional sexuality is very much alive, even 
though the Supreme Court attempted to dispel it.195 In their 
willingness to treat nontraditional sexual activity more harshly than 
traditional sex, the Virginia and North Carolina courts are not alone. 
These cases are part of a larger history, dating at least to the reign of 
Henry VIII, of legal animosity toward nontraditional sexuality.196 
Continuing this tradition, R.L.C. and McDonald join other cases 
outside the context of minors that have resisted Lawrence’s landmark 
decision and unfairly condemned nontraditional sexual activity. For 
example, several courts have distinguished the private actions of 
Lawrence and his partner from more public contexts. State high 
courts have concluded that sodomy prosecutions are still valid when 
 
 192. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371 (2004 & Supp. 2008) (criminalizing only vaginal 
intercourse with a minor older than fifteen as a misdemeanor, rather than other forms of sex). 
 193. Id. 
 194. See McDonald v. Commonwealth, 645 S.E.2d 918, 923 (Va. 2007) (arguing that the 
statute governing statutory rape refers only to “sexual intercourse” and does not address other 
sexual acts). 
 195. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has 
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a 
law prohibiting the practice . . . .” (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting))). 
 196.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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the accused committed the act in public (as a charge added to public 
indecency accusations)197 or when the case involves prostitution (as a 
charge added to prostitution charges).198 Similarly, the Eleventh 
Circuit held Lawrence has no bearing on Alabama’s ban on the sale 
of sex toys because the state has an interest in preserving “public 
morality.”199 Others have addressed this public-private distinction,200 
and it represents another way—other than the age of the 
participants—that courts have limited Lawrence to its facts to avoid 
recognizing nontraditional sexual behavior as legitimate. 
Animosity toward oral sex is archaic; it represents a fundamental 
incomprehension of the reality of teenage sexuality. According to a 
study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 44 percent 
of males and 42 percent of females between the ages of fifteen and 
seventeen have engaged in oral sex in the United States.201 Under the 
law the supreme courts of North Carolina and Virginia articulated, 
nearly half of the teenagers in North Carolina and Virginia are felons. 
Moreover, by the time these teenagers reach their midforties, 
approximately 90 percent of them will have engaged in oral sex.202 
Without the Supreme Court’s Lawrence decision, nearly all of the 
people in both North Carolina and Virginia would be felons under 
the same general prohibition of sodomy under which R.L.C. was 
convicted. 
These statistics cast serious doubt on whether the legislatures of 
these states actually intended the results their supreme courts reached 
or whether these courts’ decisions were rather the result of the 
legislatures’ failures to update their penal codes following the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence. Oral sex is no longer regarded 
as nontraditional—it is typical. When 90 percent of a state’s 
 
 197. Singson v. Commonwealth, 621 S.E.2d 682, 685–86 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) (distinguishing 
the facts of Lawrence from sodomy offenses committed in public rather than in the defendant’s 
home). 
 198. State v. Thomas, 891 So. 2d 1233, 1238 (La. 2005) (distinguishing Lawrence from cases 
in which the sodomy charges related to prostitution). 
 199. Williams v. Att’y Gen., 378 F.3d 1232, 1235–36 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 200. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis & Shannon Gilreath, Transforming Teenagers into Oral 
Sex Felons: The Persistence of the Crime Against Nature After Lawrence v. Texas, 43 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 155, 188 (2008) (noting a North Carolina court’s interpretation of Lawrence as 
invalidating the crime-against-nature statute when applied to private, but not public, sexual 
conduct). 
 201. MOSHER ET AL., supra note 13, at 25. 
 202. See id. (citing data showing that 90.1 percent of males and 88.3 percent of females aged 
25–44 have engaged in oral sex). 
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population could be considered a felon, enforcing these statutes 
defies logic. Thus, in addition to revisiting their penal codes to ensure 
that state laws adequately protect minors from sexual exploitation, 
states should ensure that their statutory regimes reflect modern 
sexual mores. 
These decisions and the continuing animosity toward 
nontraditional sexuality they appear to exhibit also may produce the 
opposite of the law’s intended result: they expose the vast majority of 
teenagers who engage in oral sex to new harms the criminal justice 
system may cause. One of the principal focuses of the Supreme Court 
in Lawrence was the stigma associated with prohibiting sodomy. That 
stigma comes, as Professor Tribe suggests, from degrading the sexual 
relationship in which individuals participate in nontraditional sexual 
acts.203 According to the Supreme Court, “[w]hen homosexual 
conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in 
and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to 
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.”204 That 
logic extends beyond application to just homosexuals: when the state 
makes nontraditional sexuality criminal, that declaration invites 
people to subject its participants—gay and straight—to discrimination 
and humiliation. Adolescents struggling with the development of 
their sexuality need encouragement from the state, not humiliation. 
CONCLUSION 
R.L.C., McDonald, and this Note address a situation in which a 
minor willfully participates in consensual but nontraditional sexual 
activity when traditional sex would have been lawful. Admittedly, as 
Justice Timmons-Goodson of the North Carolina Supreme Court 
wrote, “[s]exual activity by young people with limited life experience 
and education is troubling.”205 But this concern does not justify 
outlawing only some kinds of sexual behavior. When the state has 
decided minors may lawfully engage in sexual intercourse, courts 
should understand the protections Lawrence articulated to prevent 
states from policing the specific acts in which those minors engage. 
 
 203. See Tribe, supra note 74, at 1904 (“[T]he prohibition’s principal vice was its 
stigmatization of intimate personal relationships between people of the same sex . . . .”). 
 204. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). 
 205. In re R.L.C., 643 S.E.2d 920, 926 (N.C. 2007) (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Lawrence implied that the statutory regimes of many states are 
unconstitutional and may no longer adequately protect minors. 
Lawrence held that adults possess a right to sexual privacy, which the 
state may not infringe for morality alone. Because the Supreme Court 
has held that minors share similar rights to privacy when the state 
lacks a unique interest to justify burdening that right, the protections 
of Lawrence should be extended to minors. Thus, legislatures should 
revisit their outdated sodomy laws, some of which have existed since 
the reign of Henry VIII.206 If they redraft these statutes, legislatures 
should consider the implications of due process and equal protection: 
laws governing the sexual activity of minors should only regulate 
nontraditional sexual activity to the same extent that the state 
prohibits traditional sexual contact. Animosity toward the 
nontraditional does not justify disparate treatment. 
The long reign of Henry VIII needs to end. 
 
 206. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
